Tuesday 01 April 2003

You need a shovel not a slogan to dig yourself out of a hole

“Iraq has Highway 28. South Vietnam had Route 19, which ran from the coast up into the Central Highlands,” wrote Joseph L. Galloway last week. “It was garrisoned from beginning to end by American and Korean soldiers guarding the bridges and the high mountain passes.”

Off to the right of Route 19, on a barren hill, stood a monument and a small, empty cemetery full of markers bearing the names and ranks of an entire regiment of France’s finest, Groupe Mobile 100, proud veterans of the war in Korea.

As their column drove across the Man Yang Pass between An Khe and Pleiku in 1954, they were ambushed by Viet Minh guerrillas. They all died on that lonely highway, and with them died the last hope of French victory in Indochina.

Galloway wrote the book We Were Soldiers Once… And Young, with Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry during the battle of Ia Drang in November, 1965. In the book, Moore describes a visit to the French cemetery:

Shortly after we arrived in Vietnam, Sergeant Major Plumley and I took a jeep and a shotgun guard and drove ten miles west of An Khe on Route 19, into no-man’s-land, to the PK 15 marker post. There, the Viet Minh had destroyed most of the French Group Mobile 100 in a deadly ambush eleven years earlier. We walked the battleground, where a bullet-pocked six-foot-high stone obelisk declares in French and Vietnamese: “Here on June 24, 1954, soldiers of France and Vietnam died for their countries.” In my hand was Bernard Fall’s Street Without Joy, which describes the battle. Plumley and I walked the battleground for two hours. Bone fragments, parts of weapons and vehicles, web gear and shell fragments and casings still littered the ground. From that visit I took away one lesson: Death is the price you pay for underestimating this tenacious enemy.

In the movie version, We Were Soldiers, Lt. Col. Moore—played by Mel Gibson—is obsessed by the French defeat, poring over books about the engagement and devising tactics to protect his men from a similar fate. The film opens with a flashback to the massacre.

At the end of the firefight, a Viet Minh soldier stands over a wounded Frenchman and asks his commander: “Do we take prisoners?”

“No,” replies the officer. “Kill all they send… and they will stop coming.”

It is one of the most fondly cherished illusions of the anti-Vietnam protest movement that they played a major role in bringing the war to an end. Such a claim demeans the courage and tenacity of the Vietnamese who had endured occupation by the French since 1884, the Japanese during the Pacific War, the French again until their defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and then by the Americans and their Korean and Australian allies.

The influence exerted by the anti-war movement is negligible when compared to the sacrifices made by generations of Vietnamese who dedicated their lives to the liberation of their homeland—and to the sacrifices made by those on the American side who fought with sincerity of purpose. That Vietnam is united and no longer colonized is due not to the anti-war movement but to the implacable determination characterized by the Viet Minh officer, a single-mindedness that Lt. Col. Moore recognized and respected in the North Vietnamese regulars who followed in that officer’s footsteps.

My last entry, which challenged the peace/anti-war movement to offer more than the tendentious narcissism of street marches, provoked a range of angry responses—most of which focused on my depiction of conventional protest as little more than hollow rhetoric. In doing so, they ignored both the substance and the subtleties of my argument:

  • I was paralyzed by the war in Iraq; Steve Himmer energized me and pointed to a way forward.
  • Military victory in Iraq is irrelevant, the political war is lost.
  • If the coalition “wins” militarily, they will eventually lose the war of occupation (as did the French and the United States in Vietnam). If they lose militarily, Islamic fundamentalism—and, consequently, terrorism—will be strengthened and energized.
  • We are now all at greater risk than had the war not been prosecuted.
  • We don’t have the right leadership. To put it bluntly, we’re fucked.
  • Chanting “End the war” and “We want peace” is a ludicrous response to the predicament we now find ourselves in.
  • I have some reading to do. (In other words, I can no longer sit on the sidelines but must engage at some level with the protest movement and work to find a solution.)

From the sobbing, handwringing, bruised egos, and despair that greeted my post arose—in my comments and in the comments on Steve’s and Burningbird’s posts—the beginnings of a determination to devise practical approaches to digging ourselves out of the shit we’re in. Steve Himmer understood exactly what I was saying (although he remains as committed as I am opposed to the tactics of conventional protest):

I don’t agree that these tactics are unsophisticated, because I’m a firm believe in intelligent, political ‘play’ as a radical critique of capitalist projects, and I also have greater faith in them as valuable—Johnson and Nixon both acknowledged the impact of protests on their Viet Nam policies—but I also have to agree with Jonathon in a way. There needs to be something else, too; there needs to be a proactive element to the peace movement to bolster the reactive we’ve been seeing so much of. We need to be able, when our marches are stopped in the street by those who disagree and demand of us, ‘If not war, what then?’ when we concur that Saddam Hussein should not remain in power (I won’t assume that all peace activists feel that way, but I assuredly do), we need to be able to answer firmly, powerfully, and with as much evidence, articulation, and forethought as the Neo-Con warhawks have been able to muster in pushing their destructive agenda.

Burningbird—after taking me to task for “mocking” those who have marched for peace and characterizing me as an exponent of Elegant Despair—came back with three superb postings:

Burningbird wrote too much for me to quote but this resonated:

The peace movement, or whatever we call it, does need to focus, and I think this conversation now is a good one and I’m appreciative that it’s started. But I also think there’s a deep disappointment underlying some of the pushback against the movement. Ultimately, we failed people — we didn’t stop the war and we didn’t come up with a alternative that would stop this war in time. Now, the coalition of Bush and Blair and Howard have invaded Iraq and we’re in for some nasty, nasty times. We failed the world by not stopping this. So now, we’re being asked, what are we going to do about it?

That I don’t have a high regard for the peace/anti-war movement will not surprise anyone who has read even a few of my war-related entries. Many of the Australian anti-Vietnam protestors of my generation are now sleek state and federal politicians, judges, university professors, or government bureaucrats—drawing fat salaries and looking forward to even fatter pensions while many of the veterans they spat on and reviled are either crazy, sick, dead, or damaged in a thousand other ways: struggling with guilt and shame, their marriages broken, the suicide rate amongst their children three times that of the general Australian community.

I can’t watch the current anti-war/peace protests without having my feelings contaminated by the bitterness and contempt I hold towards those who imagined they were doing good by denigrating our Vietnam veterans and magically wound up doing well.

It will be part of my struggle to put those feelings aside, although I know I’ll never join a march. But my criticism of conventional protest is based on more than anger and resentment. I believe with all my heart that the current anti-war/peace protests are based on a paradigm that is thirty years out of date.

I’d figured out by the time I was 19 years old that the Domino Theory was bullshit and that Vietnam posed no threat to anyone other than its immediate neighbors, Laos and Cambodia. So protestors could chant their slogans and wave their placards without exerting any significant influence but also—as long as they attacked the war and not the soldiers fighting it—without doing any real harm.

Our situation is radically different. Muslim fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism pose a grave threat to all of us. To paraphrase Ann Coulter, they want to invade our countries, kill our leaders, and convert us to Islam. Think I’m exaggerating? Pay $2.95 to the New York Times and read Paul Berman’s The Philosopher of Islamic Terror.

The word PEACE is not like a lump of anti-terrorist Kryptonite that will miraculously weaken the bad guys then gradually make them love us. Being against war is admirable in theory but the real challenge is to devise strategies that will safeguard our lives and our values and protect us from what are now tangible and terrible dangers. The neo-conservatives have dumped us in this mess and, as usual, courageous soldiers are expected to make unimaginable sacrifices. We have to figure out how to extricate ourselves. As Burningbird wrote, we have a great deal of thinking and work to do.

For death is the price we will pay for underestimating this tenacious enemy.

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Comments

This is a conversation that needs to take place all over, Jonathon, and I'm glad it is. I'm also pleased that we're able to do it (more or less) while recognizing that many of us have different approaches to achieving similar if not identical goals. Hopefully, we'll listen to each carefully enough to recognize those commonalities.

I'm going to write later, I hope, about why I'm committed to conventional protest in addition to other routes.

For now, I'd like to point out that in your paraphrasing of Ann Coulter you highlight our most extreme fears about Islam. And though they may be true of Islamic extremists, these are not the general qualities of the wider faith. This, for me, is exactly the same as the way Muslims must view a Neo-Con agenda like 'A Clean Break' (http://www.israeleconomy.org/strat1.htm): it lays out a plan to, paraphrasing your paraphrase, invade their countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to American puppet states. The plan is there, whether we agree with it or not, but it would be unfair and inaccurate to assume that it represents all Americans (I only say Americans because 'A Clean Break' is a unilateral plan). The problem, then, is that when extremists of any stripe--religious or political--attempt to speak for masses of people they don't accurately represent, those unrepresented people are the ones to most suffer.

In a nutshell, then, mass protest is a way of forcing recognition that the official voice of a state is not necessarily the voice of the people. As for the theatrics and 'play', those allow the expression of an individual voice within a collective, absolutely essential when the purpose of protest is to demand recognition of the unrepresented, individual voice. Hopefully I'll be able to articulate this a bit more clearly in a post on my own site after I finish the morning's work.

Posted by steve on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Happy to see this conversation.

There following pieces from the NYTimes, Salon, and WorkingForChange are relavent:

http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2003/03/27/antiwar_movement/index_np.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/29/international/worldspecial/29PROT.html

http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?ItemID=14739

The question now becomes... do people continue to start up new efforts - or band together?

Steve - "mass protest is a way of forcing recognition that the official voice of a state is not necessarily the voice of the people."

There is a way that politicians pay close attention to that's even more effective -
Change the polling numbers.

Let me repeat that -
Change the polling numbers.

Where protest can have it's greatest effect is in helping to open up minds and build bridges to those that might not be aware of the realities taking place.

The world needs bridge builders.

Posted by Karl on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

When U.S. Representative Dennis J. Kucinich
makes points such as those below, will the pro-peace supporters send more letters of support then the pro-war folks? Will his polling numbers go up or down?

http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=14756

This is where the rubber meets the road.

Posted by Karl on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Karl, I absolutely agree that polls and voting are also important ways for dissent to speak, but I see it as 'also/and' between those and protests rather than an 'either/or'. I've just written about why here:
http://www.onepotmeal.com/blog/archives/001291.html

Posted by steve on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

We need both shovels and slogans. It was after all White House slogans (soundbites) that sold the war to the American People in the first place.

Posted by Norm Jenson on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Shovels and slogans. Sound right to me :)

I'm not as eloquent as others in this discussion and I havn't found my footing to properly express myself - at least on the web - about this.

But I do know I am on the lookout for possible alternatives. Steve nailed it in his earlier post. It is much easier to say "no" then to say "instead". It's heartening to see activism start to take root on such a large scale.

May informed and active citizenry be next.

Posted by Karl on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/oh10_kucinich/030401floorwar.html

Now *that* is taking a stand and offering a solution.

Will people rally around it or will a chorus of detractors teach others not to follow his example?

Posted by Karl on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

>>>
If the coalition “wins” militarily, they will eventually lose the war of occupation
>>>

It's just pure racism to suggest that the Iraqi people are incapable of democracy. Or, if you're not racist, then please explain why in the world you think democracy will fail in Iraq?

Posted by Lawrence Krubner on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

This line is very good:

"To paraphrase Ann Coulter, want to invade our countries, kill our leaders, and convert us to Islam."

Posted by Lawrence on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Thank you for your compliments on the three posts, Jonathon. Mathematically, it looks like I'm ahead of the game.

And I appreciate this post, which I think explains much of your view and your viewpoint. Not sure about, "From the sobbing, handwringing, bruised egos, and despair that greeted my post arose". But I have to admit, in honesty, to bruised ego and some hurt in my responses yesterday.

I agree with you on the protests, Vietnam and today's -- to a point. I think carefully managed protests for a reachable goal are effective, and will use the civil rights movement as my defense of this statement.

I am glad this conversation is happening about the peace movement, though I think we need to move beyond the validity of 'protest' as a tool, to the motivation for the protests. As you are suggesting. As Steve suggested. I would presonally like to see others involved in this, too. Involved in calm discussion, that is.

I've thought about this now for two days, and I'm still not sure what I want to resolve the crises in Iraq and the Middle East. More thought. More work to go.

As much as I agree with you on protests, and the need for thought and work, I cannot agree with your assessment of the threat of Muslim fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism. If we're just as 'wrong' to assume that the peace movement will stop this war and solve the problems, I think we're equally as wrong to assume that all these problems are arising from Muslim fundamentalism. You're a man of history -- do you really think these problems are arising _only_ from muslim fundamentalism?

As for Ann Coulter, well, I'm afraid I don't consider her to be a valid and valuable resource on this issue. I don't see us agreeing on this one, but we can focus on other things.

As for the other article, I'll scrape together the money from my broken piggy bank and get this and read this. However, I have some other reading I'd like you to do to understand my stand on this issue. I'll post this at my weblog as soon as I get them together. Not tonight but soon.

Lawrence -- the first sentence you quoted of Jonathon's had nothing to do with a stated disbelief in the Iraqi's ability to have a 'democracy'. Hopefully, eventually, they'll have a republic, but regardless -- his statement and your read seemed a bit of a leap.

Posted by Burningbird on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

And I solemnly beg everyone in all of these conversations -- can we get rid of neo-con (neocon?) as a word from our vocabulary?

I would be desperately grateful.

Posted by Burningbird on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

"It's just pure racism to suggest that the Iraqi people are incapable of democracy. Or, if you're not racist, then please explain why in the world you think democracy will fail in Iraq?"

Jonathon can certainly speak for himself, but I'd like to respond to your unfair and unfounded assertion that Jonathon is somehow a racist.

First, the quote you're responding to doesn't say that "the Iraqi people are incapable of democracy." It says the military occupation will fail. These are not the same things.

Second, it's kind of a big stretch to say there is such a thing as "the Iraqi people," there are at least three major ethnic groups and there are, and likely will remain, serious divisions and grievances between them.

Establishing a working democratic form of government in Iraq will be an enormous challenge. One of the obstacles that has to be overcome is the military occupation which is going to be a distraction to that effort.

It's a tremendously difficult problem, especially to get it right. I'm afraid that we're not going to have the fortitude to stick with it until it is right, and we'll be out of Iraq before an effective civil administration is up and functioning. Then we'll have Afghanistan II, this time with oil, in our wake, with greater instability between Iraq, Turkey and Iran than we had before, and an inviting haven for terrorist organizations to establish training bases and find financial support.

Regime change? Check.

Weapons of mass destruction? Er, check!

God's gift of freedom? Er, uh, um...

Well, two out of three ain't bad, right?

Of course, if we're planning on staying in Iraq to support military operations against Syria and Iran, well, that's another problem.

Posted by dave rogers on 2 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Piggybacking on what Dave wrote, an additional issue regarding the establishment of 'democracy' in Iraq is democracy on whose terms? The United States has tried to foster democratic uprisings and installations before, especially in South and Central Americas, but it hasn't worked. Not because democracy failed, but because the democratic leaders those countries elected weren't the ones the US wanted them to elect. For just one example, whatever you thought about Allende being a marxist, he was a democratically elected marxist, and led the US to undermine the same Chilean democracy it had previously worked to support. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1022347.stm)

I see similar problems arising with an Iraqi democracy. It has nothing to do with Iraqis being unable to be democratic, only with the likelihood that they'll elect the leadership they want, not who we want. More likely, I suspect, is the installation of a pro-US (esp. pro-US business) leader in the style of Hamid Karzai.

Posted by steve on 3 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

May I recommend the following PBS Frontlines which were greatly informative:

* http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/
The War Behind Closed Doors (yes the neo-cons are real and admit it in interviews) watch full episode online.

* http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/
Hunting Bin Laden (who is Bin Laden and what does he want)

* http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/search/
In search of al qaeda (useful to hear what people in Pakistan and the rest of the world thinks of al qaeda and why they are so hard to defeat) watch full episode online.


* http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/view/
The Man Who Knew Watch full episode online.

These shows have been extremely helpful in answering many questions. For example Shelley - what role does fundamentalism play?


Posted by Karl on 3 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Apologies... two more essays on effective activism from a famously left leaning magazine:

* http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2003/13/we_341_01.html
*
http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/gitlin/2002/42/we_175_01.html


Posted by Karl on 3 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Street marches are not "tendentious narcissism". You're not doing your point any good by describing them as such. The peace movement does more than marches, as you should know if you actually paid attention to it instead of moralising from the sidelines.

We need to end this war as soon as possible, to limit the damage being done, the lives being lost every day. The US and the UK, with its current leadership is incapable of building a democratic free Iraq, is not interested in doing so, has never shown itself to be concerned with the Iraqi people.

It's been the UK who first gassed the Iraqi people, who first "liberated" them by giving them a foreign king to rule over them, who supported the sanctions against Iraq which never hurted Saddam, but did manage to get thousands of Iraqis killed.

It's been the US who has actually helped Saddam get into power, who supported him as long as it was convenient to keep Iran from getting uppity
(and who regretted that it wasn't possible for both Iran and Iraq to lose their war), who actually got Saddam the same WMDs they're now using as an excuse to invade. And it's not just the US in any abstract sense, it's *the same people* even.

That's why we should still chant “End the war” and “We want peace” and work for it; no good will come from this war.

Anything else is hopelessy naive.

Posted by Martin Wisse on 3 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Karl, am I back in school to have someone point to me in the room and say "Now Shelley, tell us what the role of fundamentalism play?" In which case I ask back, in what way? In every day life? In the war? Leading up to the war? In terrorism? In the United States? Is it a pop quiz from the reading? Sorry, lot of links in this comment thread, haven't been to all yet.

You don't start conversations by calling people racist, or by throwing pop quizzes.

However, I did find the Mother Jones reading to be very interesting. Thank you.

Posted by Burningbird on 4 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

That question was rhetorical (I think that's the right use of the word) - I wasn't asking for an answer. Definately not ment as a pop quiz. I'm just not eloquent enough sometimes... apologies for wording it confrontational. The PBS links do give a great backgrounder and point to fundamentalism playing a significant role. Also, somehow I missed the "_only_" in your previous post. When I read it, it sounded like you denied it playing any role whatsoever.

I agree with you on Ann Coulter. Jonathan - you can find better people to quote... like Bin Laden himself. He lays it all out for us. Use the links :) I denied religion playing a role until I read his words myself.

Damn straight it plays a role. A frightening, scary, chilling role. Note that doesn't mean the enemy is a particular religion and that is such a fine line to draw.

I think we've all been in school - reading and studing furiously, challenging almost all our beliefs, since what we saw on 9/11 challenged how we believed the world worked. After all - if we knew how the world "worked" we could have seen that attack coming. Instead we were all left in shock.

I didn't call, nor read, anything racist in what Jonathan said either. Lawrence - you should apologize as I just have to Shelley above. Throwing around words like "racism" is just about as bad as people on the right throwing around words like "unpatriotic".

Posted by Karl on 4 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Not a problem Karl. And as I said, you did provide good reading material. I agree that fundamentalism is playing a major role in these difficulties, and this includes US fundamentalism. (Would be an interesting topic to address, wouldn't it? The role of fundamentalism in the US/western world and in the Muslim world, and how the two interect in this conflict. I have so much I want to write. These are the conversations we should have had long ago.)


Posted by Burningbird on 4 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

Me too :) Everytime I've seen similar conversations though, at least on the web, they've gotten filled up with folks that just want to beat down the other side, instead of finding the commonalities, the bridges, and courses of action.

The link Jonathan provided to the NYTimes piece is a big must read as well. A big differentiator is the establishment of secular society.

Posted by Karl on 4 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

We Were Soldiers is Fiction

Subj: We Were Soldiers is Fiction lacks in Technical, tatical, airmobile,infantry tatics Date: 2/26/2002 1:06:21 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: Lzalbany65 To: president@whitehouse.gov
Right-click picture(s) to display picture options

Subj: Joseph L. Galloway special consultant to Secretary of State Colin Powell
Date: 2/23/2002 3:14:31 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: Lzalbany65 To: senator@boxer.senate.gov, senator@feinstein.senate.gov, Secretary@state.gov

And you wounder why they KILL the Reporters.

Mr. JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, Training AT ALL.

Who am I? lzalbany65@aol.com Russell L. Ross 1741 Maysong ct. San Jose, Ca 95131-2727 ph 408 926-9336

Sept 1965-66 SP/4 Russell L. Ross RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam.

1964 B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning, Georgia.

1965 B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

And in July 1965 I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile.

JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY ( Rambo The Reporter ) IS NOW SELLING HIS COMBAT PICTURES FROM LANDING ZONE X-RAY. Joseph L. Galloway The Walter Mitty of the war, Rambo the Reporter, A Plagiarist, Fiction writer, and now add fraud.

Galloway brandishes a Swedish K submachinegun at Danang in August 1965. day battle. Joe prior to Xray battle

He is the only civilian to receive a medal from the U.S. Army for valor during the Vietnam War—a Bronze Star with Combat V for rescuing wounded soldiers under fire in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

( Even though Moore didnt see him do this he wrote him up for it .added by me )

A veteran of 42 years in journalism with United Press International and U.S. News & World Report, he is coauthor with retired Army Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore of We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: Random House, 1992).

Galloway—the award-winning newsman and current special consultant to Secretary of State General Colin Powell spoke recently with Fred L. Schultz at U.S. Naval Institute headquarters. STEVE NORTHUP http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROgalloway02.htm

Why is Joseph L. Galloway altering his combat pictures of Landing Zone X-Ray?? is it becouse they show the truth and not the lies written by Galloway and Moore in their Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young ( The X-Ray part ).

Joseph L. Galloway is altering some of his combat pictures to match the story line in the book, as he now has the equipement to change them.

!!!!!WARNING!!!!! if you buy these pictures, be warned, some of the pictures you see at this web site isnt the orignal pictures.

The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley, November 14-16, 1965. The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought.

The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a handful of participants in the action.

Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people.

These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming movie, "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young", starring Mel Gibson. A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe.

Stories Part Fiction Galloway embelished for them. U.S. NEWS and World Report Oct 29,1990 Pg 32 Fatal Victory Pg 36 Vietnam Story.

ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized. U.S. News and World Report Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485.

U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991 Page 49 "Who's Afraid of the truth" SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker. ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ).

In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect the wounded.

BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavly armed Reporter in Vietnam.

Page 32
Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege, and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine gun.

With two other reporters.

After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway an M-16 rifle,

Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was "A civilian noncombatant."

As you see there is no logic. Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant?

The question is why didnt Galloway join the service? He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter. He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the battle. He start's to play Soldier. You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier.

Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to the Americian troops, in His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona. He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted and go where he wanted to at any time. Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he pleased.

Page 35
November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade headquaters Galloway " I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ).

Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls. to record events, his mind set is playing soldier.

Page 32
Galloway writes: " At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee.

Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30 secounds. If you were careless it blew your arm off.

If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the price for violating the UCMJ. Conspiring to take a 4 million dollar Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16 Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf, C-4 explosive

I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left, Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in? The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the Battlefield? Did he sell it when he left? If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it?

Galloway conspired with a friend ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp. There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area, The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith needed, medical, and ammo.

At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a machinegun. and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle.

MYTH's:
Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C company's. Galloway was taking pictures. Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28 Galloway writes "During a ( LULL!!)." I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk) naplmed the Command post.

MYTH's:
Page 35 Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree.

Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During " LULL's " in the Battle, As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post, He only took pictures of the dead and wounded. Where are his action pictures?

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. This dosent include the Reinforcements Bco 2/7, 2/5 Battalion, 2/7 Battalion.

page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true. Groo

Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo

Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's??

Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing

Page 17
Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations.

By Officers he worked with in 1957.

Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test.

For or a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics.

Page 37
Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff".

Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey.

Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present.

Page 60
As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons.

FM 57-35
There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time.

Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls

Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary,

So the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY.

MYTHS of The Ia Drang Valley
Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didn’t.

and from Persons in the book That Moore and Galloway write good about give in return and adds to the MYTHS about the 1/7 and Moore.

One Reporter Bob Poos of Soldier of Fortune writes that Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp,

Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs.

Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division.

Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry.

Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in the 11AAD in 1963.

So starts the myths about Lt. Col. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to Columbus 4 hours, Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours. 8 hours to renforce Albany?

So why didn’t Kinnard send the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY?

They were probally to drunk? they had spent the day of the 17 in the Bars of Pleiku

The most outrageous LIE Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle.

FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements.

Leadership Principle 1
Be >Technicallytechnical secure LZthe reinforcement's ( Bco 2/7 ) flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes,resuppy.
Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Avation present.

FM 57-35
Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift so the loss of one aircraft does not destroy the command structure.

Page 58
Moore and Crandall in the same Huey.

Page 59
The lift is flying at 110 knots.

FM 57-35
When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift.

UH-1B's are Gunships fly at 80 knots

UH-1D's are Slicks 110 knots.

SAD PARTS
I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal, why didnt Moore lay on water for his men ( B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours ) and why he said it was not the Aviations job to haul out Wounded Troops?

B co's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics."

Page 106
Moore we needed water, medical supplies and ammo.

Page 107
Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water.

Page 145
November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water.

Page 112
November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of X-Ray & Galloway came. 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in, 1 Wounded troop not going out.

Page 106
Moore "hauling Wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation )

Field Manual M 7-20 ( It is not meant to tell the story ) of each individual, ( or to capture the same kind of truth ) a documentary would.

I salute you.

Best regards,

Randall Wallace

Things wrong with the trailer

Why is Moore shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side at X-Ray? When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat. Page 58 hardback, Page 67 paperback

Moore as they land at X-Ray. as Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the mountian. page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback

Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the over head shot there are 6 Hueys.

As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist. Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback

The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are eather in a column, trail formation< left are both are the same formation or an echelon right page 59, page 68 paperback.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY No one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman no matter how proficient he is, as he does so, who commands his battalion? Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders, he is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.

"What the hell is the is the colonel doing up here?" Sergeant Thompson ask. page 195 hardback, page 228 paperback

Moore as the battle started " I was tempted to join Nadal's or Edwards men; But I might get pined down and simply become another rifleman." "My duty was to LEAD riflemen." page 73 hardback, page 85 paperback.

Why is Moore shown leading the troops from the 1/7 in the battle for X-Ray, when he didnt, he was in the command post during combat, and only came out during Lull's in the battle. Moore " For almost 8 hours I had been involved in the mimute-to-minute DIRECTION of the battle. Now I wanted to personally walk the perimeter. Just befor dark Sergeant Major Plumley and I broke away from the command post and set out to check the perimeter." page 131 hardback, page 155

the only troops He lead were troops from the B co 2/7 and only the last counter attack on the 16th around noon.

Moore "I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander Diduryk of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job & to look for my Missing Troops. We killed 27 more and crushed all resistance." Page 195 hardback, page 228 paperback

Moore calles for illumination, and his mortars fire. Moore "No morter fire would be permited especially illumination rounds. I wanted the morters to hold back their illumination rounds for our last light in the sky in case the air and artillery folk used up all of their flares". page 184 hardback, page 216 paperback

Moore didnt call in the broken arrow code Hasting the FAC did page 149 hardback, page175 paperback

What other troops did Moore gets credit for doing it

Posted by russell L. Ross on 7 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)


We Were Soldiers=FICTION, MOORE Col. KLINK, Galloway Rambo the Reporter

Written transcript of Oral Operations Order issued by Lieutenant Colonel Harold
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

page 1, 2 to follow later.

Copy Nr_________
Hqs,1st Bn, 7thCav
Plei Me, RVN ZA 168069
140845 Nov 65


Written transcript of Oral Operations Order issued by Lieutenant Colonel

Harold G. Moore, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 140845

November 1965.

1. SITUATION:

A. Enemy

( 1 ) Possible Battalion vicinity YA 903032.

( 2 ) Possible enemy on Chu Pong Mounatin YA 935010.

( 3 ) Possible secret base vicinity YA 960020

B. 3rd Brigade continues present mission of search and destroy

South and West of Pleiku, Plei Me with 2/7 Cavalary South of

Plei Me and 2/5 Cavalary West of Plei Me.

2. MISSION:
1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry conducts Air assault operations

in area LIME ( Ia Drang Valley ) to search for

and destroy the enemy.

Operations will be concentrated on stream beds,

river beds, and wooded high ground to a maximum

height of 500 meters.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Concept of Operation:

(1) Maneuver:

The battalion will enter the area of

operations by company elements shuttling

from their present locations using 16 UH1D helicopters landing at Landing

Zone X-RAY.

Alternate Landing Zones are TANGO and YANKEE to be used only

on order.

Company B will land first and secure the Landing Zone.

The Landing Zone will be secured using the technique of sending out

reconnaissance elements from one platoon and retaining the company

( - ) assembled as a striking force.

Company A, Company C, and Company D will follow on order.

Company B and Company A on order will assemble in attack formation off

North and Northwest portion of the landing zone prepared to commence a

coordinated searching movement to the East and Northeast on order

with Company A on the right ( East ).

Company C initially Battalion reserve and Landing Zone security on order.

Prepare to move West and Northeast to search lower portion of mountian

area vicinity X-RAY.

(2) Fire Support:

There will be an 8 minute diversionary artillery preparation vicinity Landing

Zone YANKEE and TANGO, followed by a 20 minute tube artillery

preparation vicinity the primary Landing Zone X-RAY with emphasis on

surrounding terrain and the finger and draw Northwest of X-RAY.

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY

TAB C


The fowllowing is what is Missing from his order as it is an AIR ASSAULT.

Show's he was the Col. Klink of the War He knew nothing, nothing.

LACKS IN THE TECHNICAL, INFANTRY, AIR ASSAULT TATICS, LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES

Fiction Part Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway ( A Senior writer for the U.S.News and World Report ), Jack P. Smith ( Of ABC NEWS )and Vincent Cantu.

ALL other enlisted men, Officers, 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry, B company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, and the rest of the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, Their stories cannot be desputed.

Lt. Col. Moores duty as the:

AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S

CHECKLIST:

This list is designed to summarize the essential items that should be included in the planning phase of an air assault operation by Air Assault Task Force commanders. The list should be referred to throughout the planning process to ensure that major planning steps are not omitted. If there is doubt as to how to accomplish a particular task or item, refer to the unit SOPs ( or FM 57-35 and FM 7-20 ).

2. ACTION UPON RECEIPT OF ORDERS

a. Analyze mission(s).

b. Determine specified and implied task(s) and objectives.

c. Develop time schedule.

d. Obtain aircraft ACL from Air Mission Commander and/or air liaison officer.

e. Issue warning order.

3. GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

a. Choose, as appropriate, assault objectives.

b. Designate Landing Zone available for use. Consider distances from Landing Zone to objective.

c. Establish D-day and H-hour ( time of assault ).

d. Identify special tasks required to accomplish mission.

e. Means available to accomplish mission include:

(1) Organic troops ( consider distance from present location to Pick-up Zone ),

(2) Aviation resources to include attack helicopter, and Air Force support (establish liaison with Air Mission Commander and/or ALO ) ( initial information, support requirements from ground unit to include forward arming and refueling point ).

(3) Engineers.

(4) Signal to include aerial radio relay.

(5) Medical.

(6) Fire support.

(a) Close tactical air support.

(b) Field artillery within range.

(c) Other indirect fire weapons ( mortar and naval gunfire ).

(d) Preparation fires for Landing Zone ( signals for lifting and/or shifting ) .

(e) Flight corridors.

(f) Air defense suppression.

(7) Control measures needed.

(8) Subsequent operations ( for example, defense linkup, withdrawal ) that may be conducted.

NOTE: Announce concept to tail and subordinate units as soon as possible to facilitete planning.

4. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS

a. Enemy locations to include air defense positions.

b. Commander's aerial recon of objective area ( if practical ).

c. Aerial reconnaissance ( side-looking airborne radar [SLARI aerial photos ).

d. Sensor reports.

e. Terrain study.

f. Weather forecast.

g. Latest intelligence summary (INTSUM).

h. Enemy Priisoner War handling procedures.

i. Civilian control procedures.

5. LANDING

a. Selection of primary and alternate Landing Zone ( capacity ).

b. Landing Zone identification procedures for landing sites include:

(1) Colored smoke.

(2) Panels.

(3) Flares.

(4) Lights.

c. Use of pathfinders.

d. Landing formations.

e. Approach and departure directions.

f. Landing Zone preparation fires to support landing plan and ground tactical plan include:

(1) Use of TACAIR ( close air support, air defense suppression, and air cover ).

(2) Use of indirect fire weapons.

(3) Use of attack helicopters and units.

(4) Use of EW.

g. Other fire support considerations include:

(1) Shifting of fires.

(2) Lifting of fires.

(3) Suppression of enemy air defenses.

6. AIR MOVEMENT

a. Flight routes ( primary-alternate-return ) require the following data:

(1) Release Points; direction and distance to Landing Zone.

(2) Start Point; air control points, Comunication Check Points, and Release Point.

(3) Phase lines ( if used ).

(4) Estimate time en route.

(5) Maneuver areas for attack helicopter.

(6) Laagers, to include location, mission, and security.

(7) Friendly air defense considerations.

(8) Enemy air defense intelligence.

b. Air movement table to implement air movement includes:

(1) Units to be lifted.

(2) Number and type of lift helicopters allocated to each unit.

(3) Aviation units that will support unit.

(4) Lift-off times.

(5) Routes.

(6) Unit Landing Zone.

(7) H-hour ( landing time of initial serial ).

c. Alternate communications plan includes:

(1) FM.

(2) UHF.

(3) VHF.

(4) Visual/audio signals.

(5) Aerial radio relay.

7. LOADING

a. Pick-up Zone assignment by unit ( primary-alternate) (bump and/or straggler contingency plan ).

b. Holding areas.

c. Routes from assembly areas to holding area to Pick-up Zone.

d. Attack helicopter utilization ( overmatch and security ) includes:

(1) En route to Pick-up Zone

(2) While lift aircraft are in Pick-up Zone

(3) En route to Landing Zone

(4) Recon of Landing Zone; marking of Landing Zone

8. SUPPORT PIANS FOR CONDUCT OF AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

a. Alternate plans and procedures due to weather ( H-hour increment to delay operation ).

b. Downed helicopter procedures to include:

(1) Crew and passenger duties.

(2) Aircraft disposition instruction.

c. Rally points.

d. Escape and evasion instructions.

e. Laager sites.

f. Rules of engagement.

g. Deception plans that will be used.

h. Spare aircraft available.

i. Reconnaissance ( air-ground
) that will be conducted.

j. Straggler control procedures.

k. Reporting ( en route, lift-off, touchdown, intelligence, and contact ).

l. Aircraft disposition after assault.

m. Health service support and evacuation procedures.

9. ACTIONS THAT MUST BE COMPLETED

a. Warning orders.

b. Liaison officer ( receive and dispatch ).

c. Attachments and detachments.

d. Issue commander's concept ( time and place ).

e. Briefings ( time and place .

f. Preparation of OPORD.

g. Issue OPORD ( time and place ).

10. LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS

a. Class V resupply.

b. Feeding plan.

c. Water.

d. Medevac ( call sign, frequency, location, and procedures ).

e. Refueling ( location of FARP, ammunition available ).

11. DEBRIEFING

a. Lessons learned:

(1) Ground units.

(2) Aviation units.

b. Actions taken for correction.

Troops available.

a. The Air Assault Task Force should have enough combat power to seize initial objectives and protect the Landing Zone until follow-on echelons arrive in the objective area.

b. Assault ( lift ) helicopter capability is the single most important variable in determining how much combat power can be introduced into the objective area.

c. Aircrew endurance must be considered. For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.

If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can be expected on the following days.

The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander's ground tactical plan, around which subsequent planning is based. The ground tactical plan specifies actions in the objective area to ultimately accomplish the mission and address subsequent operations.

Elements of the ground tactical plan.

a. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation contains essentially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility in order to achieve surprise.

Assault echelons are placed on or near the objective and organized so as to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives and rapid consolidation for subsequent operations.

If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power.

The air assault force then assaults like any other infantry unit and the effectiveness of the air assault operation is diminished.

b. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander's evaluation including, in particular, the availability of Landing Zones in the area. The plan should include:

(1) Missions of all task force elements and methods for employment.

(2) Zones of attack, sectors, or areas of operations with graphic control measures.

(3) Task organization to include command relationships.

(4) Location and size of reserves.

(5) Fire support to include graphic control measures.

(6) Combat service support.

NOTE: This plan is prepared by the Air Assault Task Force commander, Staff with input from all task force elements and is in sufficient detail to facilitate understanding by subordinate commanders. It is imperative that all aircrews know this ground tactical plan and the ground commander's intent.
Development of flight routes.

a. Flight routes are developed based on tactical and technical factors. It may be necessary for a route to pass through an adjacent unit's sector. When that is the case, approval from that unit is obtained and coordination is made. Regardless of route direction or location, certain criteria are considered.

b. Seldom are all characteristics present in any one situation; one or more may have to be omitted. Flight routes:

(1) Are as short as possible, consistent with other considerations.

(2) Avoid turns in excess of 45 degrees, when formation flying is required, to facilitate control of the aircraft formation.

(3) Provide terrain masking to deny exposure to enemy observation, direct fire weapons, and radar acquisition, if possible.

(4) Provide cover when terrain permits, placing terrain mass and/or vegetation between the enemy and the aircraft.

(5) Provide for ease of navigation ( day or night ).

(6) Avoid masking friendly fires, particularly supporting artillery.

(7) Avoid known enemy units and air defense positions.

(8) Avoid overflight of built-up areas.

Flight corridor.

a. When there is competition for airspace, it may be necessary to modify the flight route(s) and designate a flight corridors). The corridor reserves airspace around a flight route for Air Assault Task Force use, and prevents artillery, tactical air (TACAIR), and other elements from firing or flying through when it is in use.

b. Authority to establish a flight corridor is obtained from the brigade and/or division commanders. Designated flight corridors are coordinated through airspace management channels. This ensures that airspace within corridors is not violated.

c. The corridor begins as a flight route and is then modified as required. The size of corridors varies. Normally, they extend 200 to 300 meters on either side of the designated flight route, and 500 feet above and below the route flight altitude.

d. Helicopter formations operating at terrain flight ( low ) altitudes do not require minimum altitude corridor designations. The upper air limit of the corridor may vary and would be specified by the headquarters establishing it.

e. If it is necessary to restrict the operational area to only those aircraft directly involved in the air assault operation, a restricted area can be established by the airspace management element.

Flight axis.

a. The flight axis is another variation of the flight route. It is a flight route that has width ( like the corridor ) but does not have airspace reserved to a specific altitude
( as does the corridor ).

b. The flight axis permits deviation laterally along the flight route but does not restrict the employment of other assets. It gives the Air Mobile Commander a choice in selecting en route formations and freedom to alter direction without coordinating a new flight route.

Expedient flight routes.

These routes are established with checkpoints. If time is not available to develop and disseminate Pick-up Zones, Landing Zones, and flight route information, the commander can define an expedient route by reference to checkpoints.
.
Flight route control measures.

a. Control measures assist in navigation and provide control to ensure the Air Assault Task Force arrives in the Landing Zone on time and in sequence.

b. Air control points ( ACP ) designate each point where the flight route changes direction They include readily identifiable topographic features or points marked by electronic navigational aids. A route may have as many ACPs as necessary to control the air movement. The Start Point ( SP )and Relase Point ( RP ) are also air control points

c. An ACP may be further designated as a communication checkpoint ( CCP ). A CCP is a point along the flight route that serial commanders report to the Air Mobile Commander. Radio transmissions are made only when necessary. If a report is required, the transmission is short. This is possible by using codes. For example, the short radio transmission, "One, One King," could mean that the first serial of lift I is crossing CCP King.

Designation of routes.

a. Once tentative flight routes are identified, they are designated for use by each unit. When large groups of aircraft are employed, dispersion is achieved by using multiple routes. However, with large serials it is often necessary to use fewer routes, or even a single route, in order to concentrate available supporting fires. Also, the number of alternate and return routes may be limited.

b. Primary, alternate, and return routes to be used by each subordinate unit are designated. When selecting routes, the following factors are considered:

(1) Interference with ground action. Overflying ground elements may interfere with their supporting fire. Flight routes should be clear of the gun-target line when possible.

(2) Support of landing plan. To reduce vulnerability of the air assault force, flight routes should facilitate rapid approach, landing, and departure from selected Landing Zones.

(3) Enemy ground and air capabilities. Selected flight routes make maximum use of terrain, cover, and concealment to minimize enemy observation and target acquisition.

(4) Available fire support. Flight routes allow support from all available resources.

(5) Available air cover. Flight routes are identified in order to provide air cover for friendly forces en route.

(6) Weather conditions. Flight routes remain usable based on prevailing weather during execution of the air assault operation.

(7) Terrain. Flight routes use terrain to maximum advantage to reduce vulnerability of the aircraft formations.

(8) Time ( distance ) from Pick-up Zone to Landing Zone. Flight routes are as short as possible to reduce flying time.




Posted by Russell L. Ross on 30 April 2003 (Comment Permalink)

page 2 operation order LZ X-Ray nov 14,1965


For Official Use Only

The tube artillery will be followed by 30 seconds of Aerial

Rocket Artillery followed by 30 seconds of gunship preparation

just prior to touchdown of the assault company.

All mortars under Company D mortar platoon control.

Position area to be selected after landing. Priority

of fires initially to Company B then to Company A when

move off the LZ begins.

B. Company A:

C. Company B:

D. Company C:

E. Company D:

F. Headquarters Company: Move to Landing Zone on order

utilizing 2 CH-47's.

G. Coordinating Instructions:

( 1 ) Each rifle company be prepared to assume mission of any

other rifle company on order.

( 2 ) "C" lift frequency will be used for move.

( 3 ) All rifle companies take one mortar and maximum ammunition.

( 4 ) All mortars will be brought in as internal UH-1D loads and

placed under Company D control.

4. ADMINSTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

A. No mules will be taken into objective area until cleared to do

so by the Battalion Commander.

B. Forward Supply point will be at Landing Zone Falcon ZA 022032.

C. Equipment left at Plei Me will be placed inside the Special Forces

Camp prepared for air move to Landing Zone Falcon or X-Ray on order.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

A. Battalion Commander initially will assult company.

B. Battalion Forward Command Post: Landing Zone X-Ray at Battalion

Commander's location.

C. Battalion Rear Command Post: Present location initially. Landing Zone Falcon on order.


MOORE
Lt Colonel


OFFICIAL:

DILLION
S-3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Did any Vietnam Veteran see this part.

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

We Were Soldiers
Posted by Anonymous on 2002-02-26 11:14:52
My Score:

Mel Gibson to Ann Curry TODAY show feb 25

Mel Gibson " IT WAS THEIR COUNTRY, WE INVADED THEM".

ALOHA RONNIE
Has No Life

Joined: 05 Sep 2001 03:26 am
Posts: 638
From: RONNIE GUYER

Posted: 26 Feb 2002 09:42 pm Post subject: nbc today feb 25 Gibson ouote

NEVER FORGET

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

...If it were not for MEL GIBSON and his ..''BRAVEHEART''.. Group... America would NEVER know about the Heroism of Many in the -Valley of Death- that was the IA DRANG-1965.

..''WE WERE SOLDIERS''.. steers pretty clear of Politics and focuses on the Bravehearts of America of long ago as the example they really are for US to now follow in a new -Time of War- in a New Century with an Enemy that is now Within BIG TIME.

...MEL GIBSON is welcome to his own opinion or slip of the tongue thru a process a multitude TV Interviews.

...His Actions speak volumes to US on the Silver Screen ...ALL FOR THE BETTER.

Signed:..ALOHA RONNIE Guyer / Vet-Battle of IA DRANG-1965 / Landing Zone Falcon / www.LzXray.com

NEVER FORGET
...Vet/Battle of IA DRANG-1965, U.S. 7th Air Cav S-1 Personnel Clerk, Landing Zone Falcon - Lt. Col. HAL G. MOORE''s Radioman/Dri

Subj: We Were Soldiers is Fiction lacks in Technical, tatical, airmobile,infantry tatics Date: 2/26/2002 1:06:21 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: Lzalbany65 To: president@whitehouse.gov
Right-click picture(s) to display picture options

Subj: Joseph L. Galloway special consultant to Secretary of State Colin Powell
Date: 2/23/2002 3:14:31 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: Lzalbany65 To: senator@boxer.senate.gov, senator@feinstein.senate.gov, Secretary@state.gov

And you wounder why they KILL the Reporters.

Mr. JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, Training AT ALL.

Who am I? lzalbany65@aol.com Russell L. Ross 1741 Maysong ct. San Jose, Ca 95131-2727 ph 408 926-9336

Sept 1965-66 SP/4 Russell L. Ross RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam.

1964 B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning, Georgia.

1965 B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

And in July 1965 I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile.

JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY ( Rambo The Reporter ) IS NOW SELLING HIS COMBAT PICTURES FROM LANDING ZONE X-RAY. Joseph L. Galloway The Walter Mitty of the war, Rambo the Reporter, A Plagiarist, Fiction writer, and now add fraud.

Galloway brandishes a Swedish K submachinegun at Danang in August 1965. day battle. Joe prior to Xray battle

He is the only civilian to receive a medal from the U.S. Army for valor during the Vietnam War—a Bronze Star with Combat V for rescuing wounded soldiers under fire in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

( Even though Moore didnt see him do this he wrote him up for it .added by me )

A veteran of 42 years in journalism with United Press International and U.S. News & World Report, he is coauthor with retired Army Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore of We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: Random House, 1992).

Galloway—the award-winning newsman and current special consultant to Secretary of State General Colin Powell spoke recently with Fred L. Schultz at U.S. Naval Institute headquarters. STEVE NORTHUP http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROgalloway02.htm

Why is Joseph L. Galloway altering his combat pictures of Landing Zone X-Ray?? is it becouse they show the truth and not the lies written by Galloway and Moore in their Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young ( The X-Ray part ).

Joseph L. Galloway is altering some of his combat pictures to match the story line in the book, as he now has the equipement to change them.

!!!!!WARNING!!!!! if you buy these pictures, be warned, some of the pictures you see at this web site isnt the orignal pictures.

The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley, November 14-16, 1965. The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought.

The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a handful of participants in the action.

Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people.

These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming movie, "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young", starring Mel Gibson. A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe.

Stories Part Fiction Galloway embelished for them. U.S. NEWS and World Report Oct 29,1990 Pg 32 Fatal Victory Pg 36 Vietnam Story.

ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized. U.S. News and World Report Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485.

U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991 Page 49 "Who's Afraid of the truth" SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker. ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ).

In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect the wounded.

BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavly armed Reporter in Vietnam.

Page 32
Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege, and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine gun.

With two other reporters.

After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway an M-16 rifle,

Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was "A civilian noncombatant."

As you see there is no logic. Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant?

The question is why didnt Galloway join the service? He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter. He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the battle. He start's to play Soldier. You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier.

Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to the Americian troops, in His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona. He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted and go where he wanted to at any time. Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he pleased.

Page 35
November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade headquaters Galloway " I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ).

Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls. to record events, his mind set is playing soldier.

Page 32
Galloway writes: " At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee.

Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30 secounds. If you were careless it blew your arm off.

If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the price for violating the UCMJ. Conspiring to take a 4 million dollar Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16 Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf, C-4 explosive

I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left, Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in? The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the Battlefield? Did he sell it when he left? If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it?

Galloway conspired with a friend ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp. There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area, The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith needed, medical, and ammo.

At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a machinegun. and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle.

MYTH's:
Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C company's. Galloway was taking pictures. Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28 Galloway writes "During a ( LULL!!)." I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk) naplmed the Command post.

MYTH's:
Page 35 Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree.

Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During " LULL's " in the Battle, As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post, He only took pictures of the dead and wounded. Where are his action pictures?

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. This dosent include the Reinforcements Bco 2/7, 2/5 Battalion, 2/7 Battalion.

page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true. Groo

Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo

Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's??

Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing

Page 17
Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations.

By Officers he worked with in 1957.

Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test.

For or a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics.

Page 37
Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff".

Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey.

Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present.

Page 60
As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons.

FM 57-35
There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time.

Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls

Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary,

So the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY.

MYTHS of The Ia Drang Valley
Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didn’t.

and from Persons in the book That Moore and Galloway write good about give in return and adds to the MYTHS about the 1/7 and Moore.

One Reporter Bob Poos of Soldier of Fortune writes that Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp,

Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs.

Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division.

Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry.

Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in the 11AAD in 1963.

So starts the myths about Lt. Col. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to Columbus 4 hours, Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours. 8 hours to renforce Albany?

So why didn’t Kinnard send the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY?

They were probally to drunk? they had spent the day of the 17 in the Bars of Pleiku

The most outrageous LIE Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle.

FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements.

Leadership Principle 1
Be >Technicallytechnical secure LZthe reinforcement's ( Bco 2/7 ) flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes,resuppy.
Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Avation present.

FM 57-35
Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift so the loss of one aircraft does not destroy the command structure.

Page 58
Moore and Crandall in the same Huey.

Page 59
The lift is flying at 110 knots.

FM 57-35
When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift.

UH-1B's are Gunships fly at 80 knots

UH-1D's are Slicks 110 knots.

SAD PARTS
I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal, why didnt Moore lay on water for his men ( B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours ) and why he said it was not the Aviations job to haul out Wounded Troops?

B co's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics."

Page 106
Moore we needed water, medical supplies and ammo.

Page 107
Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water.

Page 145
November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water.

Page 112
November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of X-Ray & Galloway came. 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in, 1 Wounded troop not going out.

Page 106
Moore "hauling Wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation )

Field Manual M 7-20 ( It is not meant to tell the story ) of each individual, ( or to capture the same kind of truth ) a documentary would.

I salute you.

Best regards,

Randall Wallace

Things wrong with the trailer

Why is Moore shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side at X-Ray? When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat. Page 58 hardback, Page 67 paperback

Moore as they land at X-Ray. as Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the mountian. page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback

Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the over head shot there are 6 Hueys.

As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist. Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback

The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are eather in a column, trail formation< left are both are the same formation or an echelon right page 59, page 68 paperback.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY No one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman no matter how proficient he is, as he does so, who commands his battalion? Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders, he is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.

"What the hell is the is the colonel doing up here?" Sergeant Thompson ask. page 195 hardback, page 228 paperback

Moore as the battle started " I was tempted to join Nadal's or Edwards men; But I might get pined down and simply become another rifleman." "My duty was to LEAD riflemen." page 73 hardback, page 85 paperback.

Why is Moore shown leading the troops from the 1/7 in the battle for X-Ray, when he didnt, he was in the command post during combat, and only came out during Lull's in the battle. Moore " For almost 8 hours I had been involved in the mimute-to-minute DIRECTION of the battle. Now I wanted to personally walk the perimeter. Just befor dark Sergeant Major Plumley and I broke away from the command post and set out to check the perimeter." page 131 hardback, page 155

the only troops He lead were troops from the B co 2/7 and only the last counter attack on the 16th around noon.

Moore "I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander Diduryk of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job & to look for my Missing Troops. We killed 27 more and crushed all resistance." Page 195 hardback, page 228 paperback

Moore calles for illumination, and his mortars fire. Moore "No morter fire would be permited especially illumination rounds. I wanted the morters to hold back their illumination rounds for our last light in the sky in case the air and artillery folk used up all of their flares". page 184 hardback, page 216 paperback

Moore didnt call in the broken arrow code Hasting the FAC did page 149 hardback, page175 paperback

What other troops did Moore gets credit for doing it


Subj: FRAUD= FREEMAN, ED W, Crandall dont deserve Medal of Honor, His Huey had 2 M-60
Date: 5/14/2003 12:31:57 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: senator@sessions.senate.gov

Subj: FRAUD= FREEMAN, ED W, Crandall dont deserve Medal of Honor, His Huey had 2 M-60
Date: 5/14/2003 12:30:43 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: john_mccain@mccain.senate.gov

Subj: ural to Moore's after action report, Medevac huey's were landing X-Ray on the 14
Date: 5/13/2003 1:20:40 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: Xav8er

I thought I would let you know 1st about Moore, Galloway, Crandall all LIERS,

Freeman was their DUPE.

ural to Moore's after action Report, and Opreation Order For Nov. 14, 1965
http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

Moore's after action Report LZ X-Ray Nov 14,1965 page 7 Par E-1 near bottom of page

NOV 14 1965 Moore "I did not call in the Med evac Helicopter too frenquently"

so the Med evac Huey's did and were landing on the 14 Nov 1965.

Who ever put them in for the Medal of Honer is a LIER.

Med evac Helicopters were LANDING at X-Ray.

Moore called Crandall and Freeman to land when fire on X-Ray was light.

Crandall and Freeman's unit were the only one's that could land at X-Ray.

Crandall grounded his unit, only crandall, Freeman flew mission's.

Crandall abandonded his aircraft, and flew as Co-Pilot to Freeman.

Moore should have been charged with Mansalughter, Deriliction of Duty( He didnt know what he was doing ). His Operation Order show's that.

After the battle Crandall, Moore and Mill's went to an Officer's Bar, after Moore wouldnt be served and was ask to leave, Moore then said he was going to KILL everyone in the Bar AMERICAN TROOPS.

Crandall, Mill's took their pistols out of their holsters and placed them on the Bar Moore placed his Rifle on the Bar.

the Bartender ran to get the Officer of the Day and came back to the bar.

a clear violation of art 128 UCMJ.


Crandall
he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965

BIOGRAPHY OF BRUCE P. CRANDALL
Then Major Bruce P. Crandall was assigned as Commanding Officer of "A" Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of Vietnam in 1965-66. In this position, he had command of 20 UH- I (Huey) helicopters and flew the lead helicopter on over 750 combat missions, leading as many as 60 lift helicopters plus their gunship and aerial rocket artillery support helicopters on air assaults in the central highlands of RVN. In addition to these flights, he volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation rescue flights which he undertook after the Medical Evacuation Unit responsible for these missions refused to fly due to the, intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones. Two of these volunteer missions, 14 November 1965 and 31 January 1966 received special recognition. The November 1965 missions into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley was recognized in a number of books written on the battle including We Were Soldiers Once and Young written by Lt General Harold G. Moore, Commanding Officer of the Infantry units in X-Ray; and, Joseph Galloway, a combat reporter who was in the LZ during the battle. (There is currently a movie in production of this book.) Crandall led the helicopter operations during this fierce battle which was the first meeting between a major force of North Vietnamese Regulars and a battalion-sized U.S. military unit. The January 1966 rescue was recognized by the Aviation and Space Writers Association for their first "Helicopter Heroism Award". This rescue was selected from an international field of nominees, both military and civilian, as the outstanding act of heroism involving a helicopter. At the twentieth anniversary of this award, the organization ranked Crandall's rescue as the most outstanding in the 20 years of the award. Crandall was also inducted into the elite "Gathering of Eagles" by the United States Air Force in 1996. He is one of only seven Army aviators so honored. The Gathering of Eagles is the only international organization dedicated to recognizing outstanding achievements relating to both civilian and military aviation throughout the world.

Bruce Crandall was born and raised in Olympia, Washington. He graduated from Olympia High School in 1951 and was a high school All State/All American baseball player that year. In January 1953 he was drafted into the Army. He was commissioned in 1954 from Engineer Officers Candidate School and went directly to fixed wing flight school. Subsequent to that he went through helicopter flight school. His flying assignments during the next eight years were mapping missions which included tours in the Arctic, in the desert of North Africa and in the jungles of Central and South America. His ground assignments were as Commanding Officer of Combat Engineer Companies on two separate occasions during this period. In 1963, he was reassigned to the 11th Air Assault Division at Ft Benning where he spent the next two years helping develop the helicopter air assault procedures and doctrine later followed in Vietnam by units he led there. In early 1965 he was sent to the Dominican Republic as the senior staff officer and Liaison officer to the XVIII Airborne Corps for the Division's helicopters attached to the expeditionary forces in that action. Upon returning to Ft Benning, his Division was redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and he deployed to Vietnam as Commanding Officer of A Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. In this position, he commanded a unit with 20 lift helicopters supporting combat assaults for 13 months in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. During the year he flew the lead helicopter on over 750 missions involving as many of 60 lift ships and a number of gun and rocket support helicopters.

He also volunteered and flew a number of medical evacuation missions when Med Evac pilots refused to go because of intense enemy fire in the pick-up zones.

Crandall's most noted flights were those that took place on 14 November 1965 and on 31 January 1966.

On 14 November 1965, he commanded the helicopters involved in supporting the 1/7th Cavalry's assault into LZ X-Ray in the IaDrang Valley campaign. This battle was the first meeting of an American battalion-sized unit against a far larger force of Vietnamese Regular Army troops. It was arguably the fiercest battle of the whole war and resulted in the most casualties suffered by units on both sides. Crandall's contributions can best be described by Lt General Harold G. Moore (the LTC and Battlefield Commander of the Infantry units in X-Ray) when he wrote in his book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young".

Then Major, Crandall and his wingman, then Captain, Ed W. Freeman (who later received the Medal of Honor for his actions) flew a total of 22 missions into X-Ray, 14 of which were voluntary ammunition, medical resupply and medical evacuation flights. Twelve of these fourteen were made after the Med Evac unit responsible for evacuating casualties refused to enter the intensely hot landing zone. Crandall's helicopters evacuated more than 75 casualties during a flight day that started at 0600 hours and ended at 2230 hours, more than 16 hours later.

On 31 January 1966, Crandall had just finished a flight day supporting the 1/1 2th Infantry Battalion who was heavily engaged on the Bong Son Plain along the central coast of Vietnam At dusk, en route to refuel and to shut down for the night, he was informed that "X' Company of the 1/7th, a unit he frequently supported, was in heavy contact and had a number of wounded that prevented them from breaking contact and maneuvering to a more secure area. Crandall refueled and decided to fly to the area and see if he could help By now it was pitch dark with an overcast sky which made flight difficult. He found the area because of the heavy explosions and tracer fire. He contacted the Infantry Commander Captain Tony Nadal, his friend and a fellow veteran of X-Ray and learned he had 12 seriously wounded that needed evacuation and that he had a very limited pick-up zone surrounded by trees on three sides. He also learned that Mod Evac had refused the flight during daylight hours and that the Infantry now held only a very small perimeter. The wounded were located in the center of the area where the helicopter would have to WW. Crandall's Battalion Commander, LTC Robert Kellar, was overhead in his Command Helicopter with the Infantry Brigade Commander, Colonel Harold G. Moore. They broke in on the radio to warn Crandall not to attempt the rescue if he wasn't real confident he could do so safely. They warned they did not want a helicopter downed to add to their problems that night. Crandall decided to attempt the rescue himself; in two flights, evacuating six each time. He also decided to do so without the use of search or landing lights in order to give the enemy less of a target for his aircraft but more importantly, so as not to backlight the troopers defending the perimeter and spot fighting the wounded where he was landing. He decided to land to a flashlight that he asked the Infantry Commander to put in the center of the touchdown area. He intended to approach straight down on to the flashlight in order to minimize his chances of striking the unseen trees. He had to abort his first approach when the light was turned off due to enemy fire. Captain Nadal took control of the flashlight and the next landing under intense enemy fire was successful. Crandall made a second lift under the same conditions as the first and successfully rescued 12 wounded.

Crandall received the Aviation and Space Writers Association Helicopter Heroism Award for the year 1966 for this rescue. At the 20th annual award ceremony for the award, his flights were ranked as number one over the first 20 years. Crandall was also nominated as the Army Aviator of the Year from the 1st Cavalry Division.

After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area. FALSE

med evac were landing on the 14th, Moores after action report page 7 paragraph E-1


by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire. FALSE he had two doorgunners armed with M-60 machineguns.


Medal of Honor


FREEMAN, ED W.

Rank and organization: Captain, U.S. Army, Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion,

First Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

Place and date: Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam, 14 November 1965

Born: 1928

Citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Captain Ed W. Freeman, United States Army, distinguished himself by numerous acts of conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary intrepidity

on 14 November, 1965, while serving with Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, First Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at landing zone X-ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The infantry unit was almost out of ammunition, after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone, due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire, time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical supplies to the underseige battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival without which they would almost surely have experienced a much greater loss of life.


After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area, due to intense enemy fire,

Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life- saving evacuation of an estimates 30 seriously wounded soldiers, some of whom would not have survived, had he not acted.All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman's selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the United States Army.

Russell. L. Ross
1741 Maysong ct
San Jose, CA
95131-2727

Ph 408 926-9336

The Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young is Fiction X-Ray part.
as was the Movie We Were Soldiers


Crandall dosent like Troops with PTSD

Subj: Re: ural to Moore's after action report, Medevac huey's were landing X-Ray on...
Date: 5/13/2003 11:31:12 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Xav8er
To: Lzalbany65

My wife did not want me to respond to this tirade primarily because she thought you must be someone who is under medical treatment or is suffering from some sort of mental stress.

I, on the other hand, am curious as to who you are and what experience you have had that causes you to make such wild and untrue accusations.

There is no question that the claims you made are totally untrue. I will be happy to address and refute each and every one of your so called "facts" if and when I can learn your motivation; your involvement in the action; and, whether you are under medical care.

If you have mental problems it will be of absolutely no value to respond to your harrange.

If you need medical help, I urge you to seek it.

One point that even you should understand, the book has been out for quite a few years and, to my knowledge, you are the first to question the facts relating to the 1st Cav's Med Evac units lack of flights into X-Ray or at any other hot LZ during that time period.

The 15th Med had a policy that they followed that an LZ had to be "green" (no enemy fire for a minimum of 5 minutes).
======================================================
@@ If this is true 5 minutes then Moore's time line of the story of the battle is False.
=============================
They followed that policy for at least the first 2 years they were in country.

Certainly the many pilots who flew in that outfit during X-Ray, the Ia Drang and later would have commented (denied) any such claim of their failure to perform their assigned rescue missions, were it not true.

I strongly suggest to you that in the future you refrain from calling people "LIERS" ( correct spelling is "liars") before you have the facts and before you ddisplay the courage to give them the courtesy of first contacting them with your charges and/or concerns.

Subj: Re: I'm 80% PTSD
Date: 5/13/2003 7:52:41 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Xav8er
To: Lzalbany65

Do not send me any more of your babble. Get help for your obsessions.

Galloway didnt Rescue Jimmy and his BRONZ STAR should be stripped from him.

Friend's getting Friend Medals.

Needs to be invesegated False statements by all of them Moore, Galloway, Crandall.


Posted by Russell L Ross on 20 May 2003 (Comment Permalink)

More MYTH'S of the Ia Drang LZ X-Ray

MYTH

One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.
===============
FACT
Rick belonged to the Renforceing Battallion 2/7th Lt.Col. McDade not Lt. Col. Moore's 1/7th.
===============
What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people.


MYERS

"One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young."

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction of Lt. Gen. Harold Moore, U.S. Army (retired)

Recipient of USO Patriot Award

USO of Metropolitan Washington’s 20th Annual Awards Dinner

Ritz-Carlton, Pentagon City, Arlington, VA

April 9, 2003

Thank you very much. It’s been a real privilege. Secretary Principi, other distinguished guests here tonight, ladies and gentlemen and supporters of the USO.

It’s my great honor and pleasure to introduce the recipient of this year’s Patriot Award–Lt. Gen. Hal Moore.

You all know him, although many of you before tonight may have been under the impression that he looked exactly like Mel Gibson. [laughter] The one difference that I understand is true, is that between the two of them, General Moore never wore a kilt into combat. [laughter]

What we do know is that General Hal Moore had an exceptional Army career. He began as a West Point cadet during World War II, and finished in 1977 as the Army’s chief of personnel.

General Moore is also known for his extraordinary book, written with Joe Galloway. In my view, we have no better role model today for "embedded" reporters than the relationship between Hal Moore and Joe Galloway.

Hal’s instructions to Joe and all reporters covering stories involving his battalion and later, his brigade, in Vietnam were simple: "Don’t interfere with operations. And don’t publish anything that would alert the enemy and put our troops at risk." That’s it. Other than that, the story was theirs to tell.

Some have criticized today’s embedded reporters as being too close to the troops to be objective. I, for one, think that they’re calling it as they see it–the reporters, that is. It’s simply that they realize that they’re around some real heroes. [applause]

Hal Moore is one of those heroes. And even before the book, his actions at Ia Drang Valley and his intense preparation before that famous battle were used as a study in leadership–in how selfless dedication serves as an inspiration.

Hal Moore is in fact more than just one of those heroes. He is also the outstanding example of a combat commander. When Hal was a lieutenant, The Infantry Journal published an article that declared: "No man is a leader until his appointment is ratified in the minds and hearts of his men." I can tell you that the troops commanded by Hal Moore ratified him as the best. And his leadership shaped many future leaders–in ways you wouldn’t expect.

One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.

Rick went on to become the head of security at Morgan Stanley. It was the largest company in the South Tower of the World Trade Center, with 2,700 employees. On September 11th, 2001, Rick was the calming presence on that chaotic day. He made sure that all but six Morgan Stanley employees made it out. And he wasn’t finished. Rick was last seen alive heading back up the stairs to get more people out.

What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people.

Hal will tell you that what he would most like to be remembered for is that during all his years in combat, he never left anyone behind.

Hal’s example inspired Rick Rescorla almost two years ago. It probably also inspired our Special Operations troops, Marines and all the others in the rescue you probably all heard about and saw some of–the rescue of Jessica Lynch.

Once the teams finished rescuing Private First Class Lynch, they also found a shallow grave with bodies in it. So they dug, with their bare hands, through hard-packed desert sand to get the bodies. And with their dirty and bloodied hands, they cradled their comrades in their arms and brought them home.

That’s part of the legacy of General Hal Moore, and that legacy will continue to inspire this nation.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming an inspiration to yesterday’s, today’s and tomorrow’s armed forces’ leaders: Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore.
END

Posted by Russell L. Ross on 17 June 2003 (Comment Permalink)

This discussion is now closed. My thanks to everyone who contributed.

© Copyright 2007 Jonathon Delacour